Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 15

1967

Habeas Corpus--Punishment of Criminals--Prison Management
[Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966]
Andrew R. Hutyera

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew R. Hutyera, Habeas Corpus--Punishment of Criminals--Prison Management [Johnson v. Avery, 252
F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966], 18 W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 681 (1967)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol18/iss2/15

This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

HABEAS CORPUS

1967]

HABEAS CORPUS - PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINALS
- PRISON MANAGEMENT

Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
Claims of prisoner mistreatment are frequently presented to the
courts by way of petitions for habeas corpus. An overwhelming
majority of these c6urts have traditionally refused to intervene on
behalf of prisoners who have not exhausted their administrative
remedies1 on the ground that Congress has delegated prison administration from the courts to the Attorney General.2 Nevertheless,
several courts have taken a more liberal view and have afforded relief to prisoners who claim abridgement of their rights after incarceration.3
Johnson v. Avery4 is a case representative of this more liberal
view. In willful violation of a Tennessee state prison regulation,
the petitioner, Johnson, had been preparing habeas corpus petitions
for prisoners who were illiterate and had no counsel. As a result,
he was transferred to solitary confinement.' The proceeding began
as a request for law books6 and a motion for release from solitary
confinement under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.7
The court decided to treat the case as a petition for habeas
corpus.8 This raised a jurisdictional problem in that before a state
prisoner can be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief, he must
have exhausted all of the state remedies available to him.9 Ordinarily this is a major impediment. Here, however, the petitioner
had requested release from solitary confinement, and under Ten1

See, e.g., Cannon v. Willingham, 358 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1966); Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania,
247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
2 Prisons and Prisoners Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1964).
3
United States ex rel. Westbrook v. Randolph, 259 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1938);
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cit. 1944).
4 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
5 Id. at 784.
6 The court treated this question summarily, asserting that the state is under no
obligation to furnish inmates with legal materials. Barber v. Page, 239 F. Supp. 265
(E.D. Okla. 1965).
7 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
The petitioner also sought relief under
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964). The opinion is unclear regarding upon which section
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act the petitioner relied. 252 F. Supp. at 784.

8

Actions such as the instant one are civil in nature; thus the court was presumably

acting under FE.

R. CIrV. P. 81 (a) (2).

9 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).
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nessee habeas corpus rulings, such relief was not available. 10 On
this basis the court found that the exhaustion of remedies rule was
satisfied and that it was free to take jurisdiction."
The court was next faced with a problem of whether the petitioner had standing to challenge a prison regulation which deprived
others, but not himself, of access to the courts. The court reasoned
that because the other prisoners were essentially being denied all
access to the courts, they themselves would be unable to challenge
the regulation. Thus, if the petitioner were denied standing, a rule
which is invalid on its face as conflicting with a federal law,' 2 would
go unchallenged. The court therefore found that the petitioner
had standing, and that he must be released from solitary confinement due to the invalidity of the regulation. 3
It seems that one of the major presumptions underlying the
court's decision is that it had jurisdiction to examine the validity of
the prison regulation. Most courts are reluctant to interfere in
prison administration because they believe that such authority has
been taken from the judiciary. 4 It does not follow, however, that
there is an absolute lack of jurisdiction; a better conclusion is that
the courts do have jurisdiction, but that self-restraint should be used
in exercising it.
Despite this feeling that the judiciary lacks power to supervise
prison administration, courts have interfered where deprivations
were severe. Relief has been granted where medical help was unreasonably withheld, 5 where prisoners were denied access to the
courts,16 and where certain cases of cruel and unusual punishment
arose. 7 However, relief has not been granted as a matter of course
in all such cases.' 8 As a matter of fact, an Illinois district court has
held in Siegal v. Ragen 9 that a petition alleging denial of access to
10 252 F. Supp. at 783.
" ibid.
12 28 U.S.C § 2241 (1964).
13 252 F. Supp. at 786.
14 See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
15 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
16Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1940). Contra, Siegal v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996
(N.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
'7 Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242
U.S. 468 (1917). Contra, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947);
Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951).
18 See cases cited as contra in notes 16-17 supra.
19 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. I1. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950).
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the courts failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
The circular reasoning of that decision is evident: Because the petitioner was in court, he was not presently being denied access and,
therefore, had no complaint. The Siegal case is demonstrative of
the unusual extremes to which courts may go pursuant to the doctrine of non-reviewability of prison administration.
The tendency toward abstention may actually be motivated, not
by lack of jurisdiction, but by a feeling that courts lack the expertise
to cope with the peculiar problems of prison supervision. There
may be an underlying fear that judicial action would not be based
upon an understanding of all the factors involved and that such action could seriously disrupt prison discipline.
The Johnson case serves as a rebuttal for the above argument.
The court proceeded reasonably and cautiously. It laid down general guidelines, but left room for the exercise of discretion by prison
officials, who have a better understanding of all the problems involved:
This is not to say that state prison authorities may not impose
reasonable restraints upon the activities of so-called "jail-house lawyers .... ." It may be . . . that a regulation prohibiting the
giving or receipt of compensation for such services, or restricting
and regulating the time when they could be rendered ... would
pass muster. Indeed, a regulation prohibiting the practice altogether might well be sustained if the state afforded to prison inmates any reasonable alternative, such as . . . access to a public
The present regulation, however, is absolute in its
defender ....
terms, it affords no alternatives, and it has the practical effect of
silencing forever any constitutional claims which many prisoners
might have.20
Thus, it is possible for the courts to review prison regulations
and to set guidelines for legally acceptable regulations. With regard to the Johnson case, a question arises, however, as to whether
habeas corpus is an appropriate procedural device to accomplish this
end. Most cases have held that the only relief authorized under habeas corpus is the prisoner's immediate release from confinement:2
The sole purpose of this proceeding is to inquire into the legality of the relator's detention. Habeas corpus may not be used to
secure judicial decision of any question which, even if determined
in the prisoner's favor, could not result in his immediate release.
20 252 F. Supp. at 785.
2
1 See, e.g., Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Benjamin v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 269
(10th Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Binion v. United States Marshal, 188 F. Supp.
905 (D. Nev. 1960).
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The only relief authorized is the discharge of the prisoner, and that

only if his detention is found to be unlawful ....

2

The case most often cited in support of this proposition is McNally v. Hill.23 In that case the petitioner, who was serving two
consecutive sentences, was attempting to challenge the validity of
the second sentence and thus establish his eligibility for parole. He
had not yet begun to serve the second sentence. The Supreme
Court held that habeas corpus was not available to the petitioner
for litigating his right to release from a future sentence.24 In that
opinion, the Court carefully traced the history of the writ of habeas
corpus and concluded that the only remedy available under it was
complete and immediate release. 5
While the McNally decision could conceivably be limited to its
facts, courts have consistently relied upon it for the general proposition that the only relief authorized under habeas corpus is the petitioner's total and immediate release from confinement.26
It may be argued 'that the latter interpretation of McNally is
erroneous. Habeas corpus is a civil remedy27 governed by equitable
principles.2" Equitable discretion is written into the federal statute
which permits the court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice
require. '' Such language is not consonant with the formalistic
view espoused by most courts that there is no choice of remedies.
Since the 1934 McNally decision, the Supreme Court has begun
to show a more liberal trend in interpreting the habeas corpus statute.3" For example, in Jones v. Cunningham,"' the petitioner who
was free on parole, wished to challenge by means of habeas corpus
the validity of his conviction. The Supreme Court held that one on
parole was "in custody" within the meaning of the habeas corpus
statute.3 " The language in that opinion indicates that habeas corpus
is an expanding area of the law: "[Habeas corpus] is not now and
never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has
22

United States ex tel. Binion v. United States Marshal, supra note 21, at 908.
293 U.S. 131 (1934).
24 Id. at 135.
25 Id. at 136-38.
26 See, e.g., Benjamin v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1949); United States
ex tel. Binion v. United States Marshal, 188 F. Supp. 905 (D. Nev. 1960).
27 United States ex tel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 64 (5th Cir. 1962).
23

28

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
29 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964).
30 28 U.S.C. §§2241-55 (1964).
31371 U.S. 236 (1963).
82 28 U.S.C. § 2241(C) (3) (1964).
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grown to achieve its grand purpose - the protection of individuals
against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints
upon their liberty.""3
Two other cases which indicate this trend toward a broader interpretation of habeas corpus are Dowd v. Cook,34 and Ex parte
Hull.35 In Dowd the Court granted relief without releasing the
prisoner, and in Hull the Court granted only a conditional release.
In both cases the petitioners challenged the validity of prison regulations which interfered with inmates' access to the courts. The Dowd
Court made specific mention of the flexibility permited by the statute:
Fortunately, we are not confronted with the dilemma envisaged
by the State of having to choose between ordering an absolute discharge of the prisoner and denying him all relief. The District
Court has36 power ...to "dispose of the matter as law and justice
require."
If the Court had in fact adhered to the strict view that the only
relief authorized under habeas corpus is immediate release, neither
of these decisions would have been possible.
The circuit and district courts have generally failed to adopt the
broader interpretation of habeas corpus 7 as set out in Jones, Dowd,
and Hull. The Seventh Circuit38 has gone no farther than to follow
the Supreme Court's example in Hull. On the other hand, the Sixth
Circuit has expressed a much more liberal view. In Coffin v. Reich9 the petitioner was confined to an institution for the treatment
ard,"
of drug addicts. His petition alleged mistreatment at the hands of
the guards and his fellow inmates. The court ordered that he be
transferred to another institution, justifying its action in the following terms:
A prisoner is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus when, though
lawfully in custody, he is deprived of some right to which he is
lawfully entitled even in his confinement, the deprivation of which
-serves to make his imprisonment more burdensome than the law
allows or curtails his liberty to a greater extent than the law permits.... A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen
except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him
U.S. at 243.
34 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
35312 U.S. 546 (1941).
86340 U.S. at 209-10.
37
See cases cited note 21 supra.
38 See United States ex rel. Westbrook v. Randolph, 259 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1958).
89 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
33371
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by law ... When a man possesses a substantial right, the courts

will be diligent in finding a way to protect it. The fact that a
person is legally in prison does not prevent
40 the use of habeas
corpus to protect his other inherent rights.
It was precisely this language upon which the Tennessee district
41
court relied in deciding the Johnson case.
In conclusion, it can be said that the future of the law regarding
the nonreviewability of prison regulations is uncertain. So also is
the question of which remedies are available under habeas corpus.
Presently, most courts believe that review of prison regulations is
not within the realm of judicial power. They also believe that the
only relief available under habeas corpus is total release. Cases
such as Johnson, however, indicate a trend toward broadening the
law in both of these areas.
If habeas corpus were extended to permit the courts to correct
prison abuses without necessarily freeing the complainant, it is unlikely that the pandemonium envisioned by its opponents would
occur.4" The courts are not apt to issue decrees which would seriously upset prison discipline. Johnson affords an excellent example of the reasonableness with which courts are likely to act.
Another possible outcome of such a ruling is that it would stimulate the creation of more effective administrative channels for the
treatment of valid prisoner complaints. Such a result would also
serve to free the court dockets of groundless habeas corpus petitions;
the exhaustion of remedies rule would require prisoners to pursue
administrative channels open to them before becoming eligible for
federal habeas corpus relief. Furthermore, the realization that a
successful habeas corpus proceeding is no longer a certain means
to freedom would also deter frivolous habeas corpus petitions. 3
Johnson is currently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and if that court elects to follow its 1944 decision of Coffin
v. Reichard,44 the case should be affirmed. Such an affirmance
would have an important effect on the future utilization of habeas
corpus in reviewing prison regulations.
ANDREW

R. HUTYERA

Id. at 445. (Footnotes omitted.)
F. Supp. at 786.
42 See generally Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
43 Ibid.
44 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
40
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